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a b s t r a c t
We present a novel approach for automatic repair of corrupted ﬁles that applies to any common ﬁle
format and does not require knowledge of its structure. Our lightweight approach modiﬁes the execution
of a ﬁle viewer instead of the ﬁle data and makes use of instrumentation and execution hijacking, two
techniques from software testing. It uses a ﬁle viewer as a black box and does not require access to its
source code or any knowledge about its inner workings. We present our implementation of this approach
and evaluate it on corrupted PNG, JPEG, and PDF ﬁles.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Introduction
Corrupted ﬁles may occur in many situations, e.g. due to errors
in data processing or failures of storage media. Many of these cor-
rupted ﬁles still contain most of their information but cannot be
opened by a ﬁle viewer due to small corruptions in important parts
of the ﬁle.
It is obvious that reconstructing a corrupted ﬁle to its original
form is not possible in general. However, this is often also not
necessary for the reconstructed ﬁle to be usable. Instead, it may be
sufﬁcient if the reconstructed ﬁle is sufﬁciently similar to the
original. Hence an attempted ﬁle repair can be considered suc-
cessful if the resulting ﬁle meets the following conditions:
1. A validation program opens the ﬁle without crashing or error.
2. The ﬁle contains most of the information contained in the
original.
3. The ﬁle contains very little information that is not present in the
original.
Existing approaches to ﬁle repair often scan the data of a cor-
rupted ﬁle for known patterns. For example, an approach for the
repair of corrupted ﬁles compressed with the DEFLATE algorithm
(e.g. ZIP archives) (Brown, 2011, 2013) scans for patterns such as
packet headers and is able to then partially reconstruct a ﬁle using
information about the content (e.g. English text). However, such
approaches are not only limited to repairing speciﬁc ﬁle formats but
also require manual effort in deﬁning how the corrupted patterns
are ﬁxed.
In this paper, we present Force Open, a novel approach for
automatic ﬁle repair that offers numerous advantages over existing
approaches to ﬁle repair. First, Force Open is a black box approach,
i.e. it is ﬁle format independent and only requires access to a pro-
gram binary and some valid ﬁles of the format of the ﬁle that we
wish to repair. Second, Force Open does not modify the ﬁle but
insteadmodiﬁes the execution of the ﬁle viewer, forcing it to open a
corrupted ﬁle. This is achieved by using binary instrumentation to
record executions of the program for multiple valid ﬁles to learn
how the program behaves if the input ﬁle is valid. The recorded
information consists of all the branches (i.e. jump instructions and
their destinations) where the program behaviour is the same for all
valid input ﬁles. This learned behaviour is then enforced when
opening a corrupted ﬁle, where the program execution is hijacked
and forced to follow an execution path based on the recorded
behaviour for valid input ﬁles.
We implemented our Force Open approach and evaluated it for
PNG, JPG and PDF ﬁles. In our experiments, our approach per-
formed comparably to existing toolsdPixRecovery for PNG and JPG
ﬁles and pdftk for PDF ﬁlesdin terms of the number of successfully
repaired ﬁles. More importantly, for all ﬁle formats, the majority of
the ﬁles repaired by our approach were not repaired by these
reference tools. Our Force Open approach therefore complements
these tools. The total number of repaired ﬁles on average increases
by 84.82% for PNG ﬁles, 35.92% for JPG ﬁles, and 31.30% for PDF ﬁles.
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Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
 We propose a novel black box approach for repairing corrupted
ﬁles without requiring any knowledge about the ﬁle format. Our
approach is based on modifying the execution of a ﬁle viewer
instead of ﬁxing a ﬁle directly.
 We present a set of algorithms to realise this approach, con-
sisting of a training algorithm that learns the behaviour of a ﬁle
viewer for valid input ﬁles and an algorithm that enforces this
behaviour for invalid input ﬁles.
 We implement and evaluate the approach for PNG, JPG, and PDF
ﬁles. Our results indicate that the Force Open approach can be
used to improve the repair quota of existing ﬁle repair programs
signiﬁcantly.
Related work
The most closely related research to that presented here is
Docovery (Kuchta et al., 2014), a tool that uses symbolic execution,
another technique from software testing, to reconstruct documents
without prior knowledge about the underlying ﬁle format. The
approach presented in Docovery is, however, not a complete black
box approach, as it requires access to the source code of the used
ﬁle viewer for the symbolic execution. In addition, our approach is
much more lightweight as it does not require expensive symbolic
execution.
Other research regarding ﬁle repair is speciﬁc to a single ﬁle
format and requires in depth knowledge thereof, such as Brown
(2011, 2013), and Sencar and Memon (2009).
Less closely related research includes the technique for input
rectiﬁcation presented by Long et al. (2012), which sanitises inputs
to application such that they resemble typical inputs to prevent the
exploitation of security vulnerabilities. Similar to the approach that
we present here, their approach uses a training phase to collect
information about typical input ﬁles. However, while our approach
modiﬁes the program execution, their approach modiﬁes the input
data and is used for input sanitization instead of ﬁle repair.
Preliminaries
A ﬁle may be deﬁned to be corrupted whenever it contains any
form of error. However, this deﬁnition is too broad for many
practical purposes. Take for example a large picture, where the
colour of one pixel is changed from blue to green. For almost all
purposes of the picture, this change is unnoticeable and thus the
corruption is of limited relevance. In many such cases, it is
impossible to decide whether a ﬁle is corrupted or not.
We will use a narrower deﬁnition of ﬁle corruption here. File
format speciﬁcations explicitly or implicitly deﬁne a ﬁnite set of
constraints for ﬁles. In the context of this paper, a ﬁle is corrupt if it
does not satisfy the speciﬁcation's constraints:
Deﬁnition 1. Let a ﬁle format speciﬁcation be given. A ﬁle is corrupt
with respect to the ﬁle formal speciﬁcation if it violates at least one of
the speciﬁcation's constraints.
With this notion of corruption, it is trivial to repair any cor-
rupted ﬁle by simply assigning it to a ﬁle that meets a given ﬁle
format speciﬁcation. We therefore require that a repaired ﬁle
contains useful information and that it does not introduce false
information. Thus a successful ﬁle repair must optimize two pa-
rameters: It must contain as much information of the original ﬁle as
possible and introduce as little information that is not contained in
the original as possible.
Since a corrupted ﬁle violates some constraints, common ap-
proaches to ﬁle repair try to modify the ﬁle so that it meets all
constraints. In order to do this, one ﬁrst needs to know all con-
straints and second one needs to solve the constraints in a way that
preserves as much of the ﬁle as possible. Finding and solving all
constraints is difﬁcult and requires knowledge about the ﬁle format
speciﬁcation.
A key insight that powers our Force Open approach is that the
satisfaction of these constraints often manifests in the execution of
the ﬁle viewer. For example, a ﬁle viewer will always take a certain
branch if a checksum constraint is satisﬁed or when a ﬁle starts
with the correct ﬁle signature.
Let us take for example a valid PNG ﬁle. One of the constraints
given by the PNG speciﬁcation (World Wide Web Consortium,
2003) is:
“The ﬁrst eight bytes of a PNG datastream always contain the
following (decimal) values: 137 80 78 71 13 10 26 10”
This constraint is manifested, for instance, in the function
png_read_sig in pngrutil.c of libpng in the snippet shown in
Listing 1.
The function png_sig_cmp that is called here, compares the
whole signature or parts of the signature of the ﬁle to the correct
value. In the execution of this code snippet, a ﬁle that does not fulﬁl
the ﬁle signature constraint, e.g. a ﬁle that starts with 137 80 78
200 13 10 26 10 instead of 137 80 78 71 13 10 26 10will produce
an error here. Valid ﬁles satisfy the constraint and thus the
executionwill always behave the same, i.e. the programwill always
take the true branch (Fig. 1).
Our approach builds on this and instead of changing the ﬁle
itself modiﬁes the execution of the ﬁle viewer to behave as if its
input ﬁle is valid.
The intuition why this approach may work for ﬁle repair is that
the ﬁles of the same ﬁle format share many similar traits, not only
the ﬁle signature. For example, other common constraints for ﬁles
are checksums for some ﬁle data. These constraints are manifested
by integrity checks that many ﬁle viewers use to decide whether
the ﬁles are valid or corrupted. A ﬁle viewer may refuse to open a
Listing 1: Code snippet that checks for PNG signature.
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ﬁle due to such a check, even though the ﬁle might still be recog-
nisable if this check is simply skipped.
These integrity checks are often necessary to prevent unwanted
behaviour such as segmentation faults or possible security vul-
nerabilities. Typically, an integrity check will compute a checksum
of the ﬁle data and compare this to a checksum that is storedwithin
the ﬁle. If the checksums match, the program continues its
execution, otherwise it will abort and show some error message
(see Fig. 2). However, failing an integrity check does not mean that
bad behaviour would necessarily occur, if the execution had been
continued. This implies that there exists a subset of corrupted ﬁles
that do not induce bad behaviour if the checks are ignored even
though they will fail an integrity check, i.e. these are ﬁles that can
be opened by forcing the ﬁle viewer to follow the path that con-
tinues its execution and thus behaving as if its input is a valid ﬁle.
Similarly, traits that are present in all valid ﬁles of a ﬁle format
are assumed to exist in the corrupted ﬁle and checks for their ex-
istence are bypassed, e.g. we would expect a PNG ﬁle that starts
with the invalid ﬁle signature 137 80 78 200 13 10 26 10 to be
nevertheless opened if the program is forced to behave as if the ﬁrst
condition in Listing 1 evaluates to false.
In order to accomplish this task, our tool is trained by opening
valid input ﬁles with a ﬁle viewer and collecting information about
these executions. In a second step, the program then forces the
execution of the ﬁle viewer based on the collected information to
open the corrupted ﬁle. Our tool uses binary instrumentation and
execution hijacking and thus does not require access to the source
code of the instrumented program.
File repair
In this section we formalize the ﬁle repair problem.
Terminology
We start with several preliminary deﬁnitions. Let I be a set of
inputs and O a set of outputs. We do not further specify I and O. In
practice, I and O are inﬁnite sets that contain all ﬁnite binary se-
quences. For example, I may contain binary sequences that repre-
sent PNG and JPEG ﬁles, while O contains binary sequences send
out to output components, such as the RGB values for each pixel of
the user's screen. The inputs I are typically stored as ﬁles, and we
use the terms input, ﬁle, and input ﬁle interchangeably.
A speciﬁcation S : I/O is a partial function mapping input to
outputs. We call an input ﬁle i valid for a speciﬁcation S if SðiÞ is
deﬁned, and otherwise we call i invalid. We write IS for the set of
valid inputs for S. For example, the PNG speciﬁcation (World Wide
Web Consortium, 2003) deﬁnes the set of valid PNG ﬁles. The
output of a program that implements a speciﬁcation S is undeﬁned
for any invalid input ﬁle. In practice, the program returns an error
message for invalid input ﬁles. If the program does not detect that a
ﬁle is invalid it may also throw a runtime error and crash.
The set IS of valid ﬁles for a speciﬁcation S is typically deﬁned by
a set of constraints. For example, the constraint given in Section
Preliminaries, which states that the ﬁrst eight bytes of a PNG ﬁle
must be 137 80 78 71 13 10 26 10, deﬁnes a constraint that all PNG
ﬁles must satisfy. We extensionally deﬁne a constraint C as a set of
ﬁles, and the set IS of valid ﬁles is then the intersection of all con-
straints. An input ﬁle i satisﬁes a constraint C if i2C. Formally, the
example PNG constraint contains all ﬁles that indeed start with the
bytes 137 80 78 71 13 10 26 10. Note that such constraints are
usually inﬁnite sets, and they are intensionally deﬁned as a
computable function jC : I/f0;1g that returns 1 if i2C and
otherwise jCðiÞ ¼ 0.
File repair
File corruptions change the contents of a ﬁle and can turn a valid
ﬁle into an invalid one. We denote the corrupted version of a ﬁle i
by bi. As illustrated in Section Preliminaries, even minor modiﬁca-
tions to a ﬁle can make it invalid. Such modiﬁcations typically
render the corrupted ﬁle unusable, simply because most imple-
mentations of the speciﬁcation refuse to open invalid ﬁles. The ﬁle
repair problem is to mitigate this issue by computing an output o
that is similar to SðiÞ using only the corrupted version of the ﬁle (i.e.
bi) and (an implementation of) the speciﬁcation S. To formalize the
notion of similarity, we assume a similarity measure
s : O O/½0;1 that quantiﬁes the similarity between two outputs.
For example, a similarity measure between two images displayed
on a screen may return the fraction of pixels that differ. Given two
image outputs o and o0, sðo; o0Þ is then 1 if all pixels deﬁned by o and
o0 have identical RGB values. We write ozo0 if sðo; o0Þ  q, where
q2½0;1 is a ﬁxed similarity threshold. Formally, we deﬁne the ﬁle
repair problem as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. Given an invalid ﬁle bi and a speciﬁcation S, ﬁnd an
output o such that ozSðiÞ.
Several remarks are due. First, if the invalid ﬁle bi is too different
from the original valid ﬁle i, then the ﬁle repair problem may be
impossible to solve. It is indeed not possible to repair a ﬁle i if all
bytes of i are replaced by, e.g., zeros. Second, the ﬁle repair problem
is trivial if we set the similarity threshold q to 0. This is because if
q ¼ 0 then one can use an arbitrary valid ﬁle i to compute an output
o from the range of S.
Most existing work on ﬁle repair aims to modify the invalid ﬁlebi
and turn it into a valid ﬁle i0 that is similar to bi. Typically, this boils
down to modifying as few bytes ofbi as possible so as to transformbi
into a valid ﬁle. Several approaches attempt to ﬁrst discover whichFig. 2. Checksum check in a program execution.
Fig. 1. Checking a PNG ﬁle signature in a program execution.
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constraints are violated by bi and then use constraint solving to
change bi into a valid ﬁle i0. For example, if the ﬁrst eight bytes of a
corrupted PNG ﬁle do not match those prescribed by the PNG
speciﬁcation, then one can replace the ﬁrst eight bytes by the ex-
pected sequence of bytes to derive a ﬁle i0; if i0 is valid then Sði0Þ is a
solution to the ﬁle repair problem. Constraint solving can be,
however, prohibitively expensive if the speciﬁcation deﬁnes com-
plex constraints. File repair approaches based on constraint solving
thus typically focus on a portion of bi's bytes, namely those that are
most likely responsible for violating constraints.
The Force Open approach
Our program works in two phases. We will call the ﬁrst phase
training phase and the second phase force open phase. The training
phase is used to record information about the execution of the ﬁle
viewer when opening valid ﬁles, and is described in detail in Sec-
tion Training phase. In the force open phase, the ﬁle viewer is then
forced to behave as if the input ﬁle is valid with the hope that a
corrupt input ﬁle will be opened successfully. This phase is
described in detail in Section Force open phase. A graphical over-
view of the complete workﬂow is given in Fig. 3.
Training phase
The training phase is used to gather information about the
branches taken by the ﬁle viewer during the execution with valid
input ﬁles. For each branch that is taken during the execution, we
record
 the location of the branch in the program and
 the location of the instruction that is executed after branching
We call the algorithm used to collect this information branch-
trace (Algorithm 1). This algorithm executes the ﬁle viewer with an
input ﬁle and for every branch on the executed path we record a
tuple ðsource; destÞ storing the location of the branch (source) and
the location of the program counter after the branch statement has
been executed (dest). These pairs are added to a list, which is
returned by the algorithm after the ﬁle viewer has ﬁnished its
execution.
The list returned by the branchtrace algorithm is by itself only of
limited usefulness. It is simply a record of the execution path taken
by a single execution of the ﬁle viewer with a speciﬁc input ﬁle. As
the execution paths differ for different valid input ﬁles, we need to
collect only the branches that have the same behaviour for all valid
ﬁles. However, we cannot collect information about the executions
with all valid input ﬁles. Therefore, we need a training algorithm that
collects information from executionswithmany different valid input
ﬁles and combines the collected information in a meaningful way.
The SameBranchBehaviour algorithm (Algorithm 2) is a simple
training algorithm. It takes a list of correct ﬁles and a program as
input and creates an empty set branches. It then loops through all
ﬁles in the ﬁle list and for each ﬁle executes the branchtrace algo-
rithm (Algorithm 1). The branches returned by branchtrace are
added to branches.
After the loop is completed, the algorithm checks for every tuple
of the form ðsource; destÞ in branches whether an entry
ðsource;dest2Þwith destsdest2 exists in branches. If that is the case,
both tuples are removed from branches. The algorithm then returns
the set branches which contains exactly the branches that always
have the same outcome for all valid ﬁles. Thus, the output of the
Fig. 3. Force Open workﬂow.
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algorithm contains exactly those branches for which the behaviour
is the same for all input ﬁles.
If all recorded traces consist of exactly the same set of branches
(ignoring the outcome), this algorithm will produce the intersec-
tion of the recorded tuples. However, we cannot assume that all
traces will contain the same branches, which is why we do not
simply compute the intersection. In fact, two traces may consist of
almost completely disjoint sets of branches, i.e. they could only
share a single branch (with different outcomes, since the execution
paths differ from that point onwards) causing the intersection of
tuples to be the empty set.
Force open phase
The force open algorithm (Algorithm 3) uses execution hijacking
in order to force the behaviour of the ﬁle viewer. It takes a program,
a ﬁle and a list of branches as input. The list of branches could in
general be any list of branches, but it is intended to be a list
compiled by a training algorithm such as Algorithm 2 from Section
Training phase.
The algorithm loops through all branches in the input program
and for every branch checks whether the branch is contained in the
list of branches. If that is the case, the branch in the program is
replaced by an unconditional jump to the destination stored in the
branch list for this speciﬁc branch. After the loop is ﬁnished, the
modiﬁed program is executed with the input ﬁle as argument.
Implementation
The Pin framework (Luk et al., 2005) can be used to write custom
dynamic instrumentation tools, called pintools, that work directly on
x86 and x86e64 binaries. By using Pin to implement the branchtrace
and the force open algorithms, our approach becomes a complete
black box approach that does not require any knowledge about the
internal workings of the ﬁle viewer. Both the branchtrace and the
force open algorithm are implemented as pintools in Cþþ. As the
pintools work directly on the binaries and not on the source code, a
branch as used in the algorithms is any conditional jump instruction.
The jump instructions and their destinations are identiﬁed by
their memory addresses in a single execution of the ﬁle viewer.
However, as many libraries are loaded dynamically and their
location in the address space changes from one execution to the
other, the memory address of the jump instruction is not sufﬁcient
to identify the jump for multiple executions of the program.
Instead, we use the name of the module in which the jump in-
struction is located together with the offset of the jump instruction
to the base address of the module.
The branchtrace pintool takes a program and corresponding
program arguments (e.g. the name of a ﬁle that should be opened)
as input. The branchtrace pintool instruments the speciﬁed pro-
gram by inserting a function call after each conditional jump that
records the location of the jump and the location of the instruction
that will be executed next and writes them to a ﬁle.
The force open pintool takes a ﬁle containing jump locations and
corresponding target locations as input, in addition to a program
including arguments. It then instruments the program by inserting
an unconditional jump to the respective target before each jump
contained in its input ﬁle and executes it.
The SameBranchBehaviour algorithm (Algorithm 2) was imple-
mented in Python. The script takes multiple ﬁles as input and either
a setup ﬂag or a list containing branch information. If the setup ﬂag
is set, the program creates an empty dictionary to store the branch
information and loops through the input ﬁles, invoking the instru-
mented ﬁle viewer instrumented to record branch information and
adding the recorded entries to the dictionary as described in Algo-
rithm 2. At the end, the dictionary entries are written to a ﬁle.
When the setup ﬂag is not set and a branch list is given as input,
the Python script acts as a wrapper for the force open pintool,
allowing for multiple ﬁles to be opened. It loops through the
speciﬁed ﬁles and for each hijacks the execution of the program
according to the branch list.
Evaluation
We evaluated our approach for the PNG, JPG and PDF ﬁle for-
mats.1 The ﬁle viewer used for PNG and JPG is the feh image viewer.
1 The tools and the data sets are available at https://github.com/ﬂdpi/forceopen.
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For PDF ﬁles we used the pdftotext command-line utility. We
compare our results for PNGs and JPGs with the results of
PixRecovery, a commercial ﬁle repair tool for image ﬁles, and for
PDFs with the results of pdftk, a command-line utility for manip-
ulating and repairing PDFs.
Test conditions and environment
The machine used for testing uses a 3.4 GHz Intel Core i7-4770
CPU, has 32 GB of DDR3-RAM, and is running a 64-bit Linux dis-
tribution. The Python scripts used for the implementations were
modiﬁed to measure total time, CPU-time, and maximum and
average memory usage. In order to create comparable conditions
and to increase usability, an option was added to the scripts to
automatically close opened pictures. The wrapper that calls the
force open pintool for each speciﬁed ﬁle uses a controller that kills
the process of the ﬁle viewer if no corresponding window is
detected within a reasonable amount of time.
Generating corrupted ﬁles for testing
The algorithm that we use to generate corrupted ﬁles for our
experiments is straightforward. In order to produce ﬁles that satisfy
our deﬁnition of corrupted ﬁle, we need to generate ﬁles that
violate the constraints implied by the ﬁle format speciﬁcation. We
approximate this by ensuring that the program that would nor-
mally be used to open the ﬁle, can no longer open it. We assume
that the ﬁle viewer is able to open all ﬁles that fulﬁl the constraints.
While there may be ﬁles that violate constraints and cannot be
produced using this method, the corrupted ﬁles that are generated
will ﬁt our deﬁnition. The generated set of corrupted ﬁles is thus at
least as difﬁcult to repair as a random sample of corrupted ﬁles. Our
algorithm to generate corrupted ﬁles (Algorithm 4) takes as input a
program, a ﬁle, and a number n specifying the number of corrupted
bytes. The algorithm then creates a copy of the ﬁle, chooses a byte-
aligned position between 0 and ðsizeðfileÞ  nÞ at random, and
overwrites the n bytes starting at that positionwith random data. It
then tries to open the modiﬁed copy with the speciﬁed program. If
the program fails to open the copy, the algorithm returns the copy,
otherwise the algorithm is repeated.
PNG
The training set for the PNG ﬁle format consists of 200 valid PNG
ﬁles of different sizes. The test set (disjoint from the training set)
consists of PNG ﬁles that were corrupted with the algorithm
described in Section Generating corrupted ﬁles for testing with
corruption sizes of 2k bytes for k2f0;1;2;3;4g. We compare the
reconstructed images to the original (not corrupted) images using
the pHash library (Zauner, 2010), which determines whether two
images are visually similar by taking into account different possible
transformations on the pictures. Note that in addition, a manual
inspection of reconstructed images showed that most of them are
visually the same as the original with no or only small artefacts.
In our tests, the training phase needed 35 min to complete,
while using 182:39% of the CPU (where 100% is one core) with a
maximum memory usage of 167 MB. The number of successfully
displayed ﬁles (i.e. the ﬁles that are opened without producing an
error) is shown in Table 1, as is the number of ﬁles that are recog-
nised by the pHash library as similar to the original. As expected,
the success rate decreases as the number of modiﬁed bytes in-
creases. The time to open (or failing to open) one image is on
average around 15 s of CPU time on the test machine for 1-byte
corruptions and 67 s of CPU time for 16-byte corruptions (due to
fewer images that can be opened) with an average memory usage
of approximately 250 MB. For some ﬁles, the process seems to
introduce a memory leak, peaking at a memory usage of almost
19 GB. As these peaks occur for very few ﬁles that cannot
be opened, this could be easily prevented by monitoring the
memory usage and aborting the child process if some threshold is
exceeded.
For the repaired PNG ﬁles with single byte corruptions, the types
of corruptions are listed in Table 2. The PNG format is a lossless
image compression format. It consists of an 8-byte ﬁle header
(containing the ﬁle signature) and a series of chunks. Every chunk
consists of a 4-byte length ﬁeld, containing the length of the chunk
data, a 4-byte type ﬁeld, the chunk data and a 4-byte CRC checksum.
Each chunk is either critical (IHDR, PLTE, IDAT, IEND) or ancillary (i.e.
not strictly necessary to decode a ﬁle correctly). The IHDR chunk is
always the ﬁrst chunk in the ﬁle and speciﬁes attributes such as
image dimensions and colour type. It always has the same length.
The PLTE chunk speciﬁes the colour palette, this chunk may be
optional depending on the speciﬁed colour type. There may be
multiple IDAT chunks containing the DEFLATE (Deutsch, 1996)
compressed image data (World Wide Web Consortium, 2003).
Whenwe take a closer look at the ﬁles that are corrupted in one
byte and compare the results of our test with the analysis of all
corrupted ﬁles (Table 2), we see that certain types of corruptions
are handled better than others. Most of the repaired corruptions are
of a type that we would expect to be repaired successfully. The
image header is always the same for each ﬁle, as is the location and
length of the IHDR chunk. The repaired corruptions (except 1) in
the IHDR data are corruptions in the parts specifying either the
“ﬁlter method” or the “compression method”, for both of which
there is only one method speciﬁed in the PNG standard (i.e. they
contain the same values for all ﬁles). Other corruptions in the IHDR
data, that are different for most ﬁles, are, however, almost never
repaired. Corruptions within CRC checksums are also handled well
with our approach, which, as mentioned in Section The Force Open
approach, ﬁts our expectations.While not all of the corruptions that
we would expect to be handled well with our approach (e.g. some
CRC checksums) are actually repaired, most of them are (see
Table 2).
We used the commercial tool PixRecovery to repair the same
test ﬁles that were used to test our tool. The results of this test are
shown in Table 1. As one can see, the repair rates of our tool and
PixRecovery are comparable. However, there is no subset relation
between the sets of repaired ﬁles.
In fact, the number of ﬁles that are only repaired by our tool is
larger than the overlap between the sets of reconstructed ﬁles
(Fig. 4a & Table 1). Thus, our approach can be used to improve the
existing heuristics signiﬁcantly.
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JPG
The training set for the JPG ﬁle format consists of 79 valid JPG
ﬁles of different sizes. The test set consists of JPG ﬁles that were
corrupted with the algorithm described in Section Generating
corrupted ﬁles for testing with corruption sizes of 2k bytes for
k2f0;1;2;3;4g (the same as for PNG). We again compare the
reconstructed images to the original images using the pHash library
(Zauner, 2010).
The training phase needed 6.2 min to complete, while using
133:90% of the CPU (where 100% is one core) with a maximum
memory usage of 26 MB. The results are summarised in Table 1. The
success rate again decreases as the number of modiﬁed bytes in-
creases. The time to open (or failing to open) one image is on
average around 19 s of CPU timewith a maximummemory usage of
approximately 50 MB.
We again compare our results to the results of PixRecovery and
while the repair rates are higher for PixRecovery (Table 1), espe-
cially for larger corruptions, the overlap is again small, i.e. our
approach still improves the overall repair rate signiﬁcantly if used
in addition to a traditional approach (Fig. 4b & Table 1).
PDF
For PDF ﬁles, we used to pdftotext command line utility as ﬁle
viewer. The training set for PDF consists of 158 text based PDF ﬁles.
The test set consists of text based PDF ﬁles that were corrupted
with the algorithm described in Section Generating corrupted ﬁles
for testing, again with corruption sizes of 2k for k2f0;1;2;3;4g.
The output of the execution using our tool is then compared to the
output of pdftotext when given the original as input using the
Levenshtein distance as a metric.
The training phase needed 4 h and 44 min to complete, while
using 216% of the CPU (where 100% is one core) with a maximum
memory usage of 115 MB. The results are summarised in Table 1.
For all ﬁles that were successfully opened, the Levenshtein dis-
tance of the produced output to the output of pdftotext with the
original ﬁle as input is zero, i.e. the ﬁles are either completely
repaired or not at all. The success rate again decreases as the
number of modiﬁed bytes increases. The time to open (or failing to
open) one ﬁle is on average around 7 s of CPU time with a memory
usage of less than 90 MB (and peaks of up to 2.3 GB in rare cases).
For PDF, we compare our results to the results of pdftk (Table 1),
which is much more successful for larger corruptions and compa-
rable for single byte corruptions. However, the overlap of repaired
documents is again small (Fig. 4c & Table 1), i.e. our approach re-
pairs additional ﬁles and could thus be used as additional heuristic
to improve the overall results.
Table 1
A summary of our results showing the number of ﬁles repaired with Force Open (FO) and a Reference Tool (RT), which is PixRecovery for PNG and JPG, and pdftk for PDF.
Corrupt
bytes
Number
of ﬁles
Repaired ﬁles
Force Open (FO) Ref. Tool (RT) FO and RT Only FO Only RT
PNG 1 597 306 (51.26%) 207 (34.67%) 144 (24.12%) 162 (27.14%) 63 (10.55%)
2 624 305 (48.88%) 174 (27.88%) 119 (19.07%) 186 (29.81%) 55 (8.81%)
4 612 215 (35.13%) 155 (25.33%) 88 (14.38%) 127 (20.75%) 67 (10.95%)
8 632 129 (20.41%) 98 (15.51%) 46 (7.28%) 83 (13.13%) 52 (8.23%)
16 630 54 (8.57%) 58 (9.21%) 25 (3.97%) 29 (4.60%) 33 (5.24%)
1 16 3095 1009 (32.60%) 692 (22.36%) 422 (13.63%) 587 (18.97%) 270 (8.72%)
JPG 1 248 37 (14.92%) 58 (23.39%) 9 (3.63%) 28 (11.29%) 49 (19.76%)
2 256 30 (11.72%) 45 (17.58%) 14 (5.47%) 16 (6.25%) 31 (12.11%)
4 249 20 (8.03%) 34 (13.65%) 6 (2.41%) 14 (5.62%) 28 (11.24%)
8 253 14 (5.53%) 25 (9.88%) 3 (1.19%) 11 (4.35%) 22 (8.70%)
16 255 6 (2.35%) 44 (17.25%) 1 (0.39%) 5 (1.96%) 43 (16.86%)
1 16 1261 107 (8.49%) 206 (16.34%) 33 (2.62%) 74 (5.87%) 173 (13.72%)
PDF 1 312 30 (9.62%) 33 (10.58%) 3 (0.96%) 27 (8.65%) 30 (9.62%)
2 320 22 (6.88%) 41 (12.81%) 3 (0.94%) 19 (5.94%) 38 (11.88%)
4 349 16 (4.58%) 49 (14.04%) 0 (0.00%) 16 (4.58%) 49 (14.04%)
8 358 9 (2.51%) 48 (13.41%) 2 (0.56%) 7 (1.96%) 46 (12.85%)
16 384 8 (2.08%) 59 (15.36%) 5 (1.30%) 3 (0.78%) 54 (14.06%)
1 16 1723 85 (4.93%) 230 (13.35%) 13 (0.75) 72 (4.18%) 217 (12.59%)
Table 2
Types of corruptions (PNG).
Chunk Field # of ﬁles # of repaired
ﬁles
File header 74 59
IHDR Chunk type 32 9
IHDR Chunk length 30 26
IHDR Chunk data
(compression/ﬁlter)
25 18
IHDR Chunk data (other) 106 1
IHDR CRC 44 33
IDAT Chunk type 55 20
IDAT Chunk length 1 0
PLTE Chunk type 3 0
PLTE Chunk length 3 0
PLTE Chunk data 70 33
PLTE CRC 5 2
Ancillary chunks Chunk type 72 50
Ancillary chunks Chunk length 77 49
Fig. 4. Overlaps of repaired ﬁles.
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Discussion
Limitations
The design of our approach inherently introduces some limita-
tions. For Example, Force Open is not capable of repairing corrup-
tions that are highly data dependant (e.g. image dimensions) and
are not in the form of some if-then-else statement. Large corrup-
tions, e.g. corruptions of the size of a ﬁle system block, also pose a
problem, since they will usually introduce data dependency.
In addition, our method may introduce unwanted behaviour in
the hijacked program. Our approach is designed to circumvent
integrity checks and as such also introduces a possibility for mali-
cious exploitation. This should be taken into account when
applying our method by sandboxing its execution.
Different training algorithms
In addition to the training algorithm (Algorithm 2) described in
Section Training phase, we also experimented with two other
simple training algorithms. However, they did not work as well,
which is why we only brieﬂy describe them here. Both other
training algorithms require not only valid ﬁles but additionally a
corrupted version of each valid ﬁle.
The ﬁrst alternative algorithm compares the executions of the
ﬁle viewer for a valid ﬁle with the execution for its invalid version
and records only the ﬁrst differing branch, i.e. the branchwhere the
execution paths ﬁrst start to diverge. This training algorithm was
not successful. By forcing the recorded branches with this algo-
rithm, Force Open was unable to open a single ﬁle.
The second alternative algorithm also compares executions of
the ﬁle viewer for a valid ﬁle with the execution for its invalid
version. However, it records all branches where the execution paths
differ, i.e. the set of collected branches is a subset of the branches
collected with the SameBranchBehaviour algorithm (Algorithm 2).
While this training algorithm was faster, the success rate for this
training algorithm was signiﬁcantly lower than for the Same-
BranchBehaviour algorithm.
Another advantage of themain training algorithm presents itself
if one considers that when training with one of the alternative al-
gorithms, we produce corrupted ﬁles for training with the same
algorithm that we used to generate our test ﬁles. Thus, the types of
corruptions in the test ﬁles are artiﬁcially generated with the same
distribution as in the training ﬁles. This means that the results
apply only to corrupted ﬁles for which the distribution of the types
of corruptions can be simulated. The SameBranchBehaviour algo-
rithm does not have this disadvantage since it does not use cor-
rupted ﬁles for training.
Instrumenting only parts of the ﬁle viewer
It is possible to only instrument somemodules of the ﬁle viewer.
For example, we can exclude some library that is assumed to have
no inﬂuence on the decision of whether a ﬁle is valid or not. This
suggests two possible advantages:
 We remove the possibility of erroneously inserted jumps that
may cause the program to fail.
 The instrumentation functions are called fewer times, resulting
in a faster runtime.
However, selecting the optimal conﬁguration of instrumented
modules is a difﬁcult problem. For example, the image viewer feh
uses approximately 70 modules when opening a PNG ﬁle. Testing
all possible combinations is therefore infeasible. Manually selecting
modules that seem to play a part in deciding the validity of a ﬁle is
possible, but this requires some deeper knowledge about the ﬁle
viewer or the ﬁle format, i.e. this would no longer constitute a
complete black box approach.
Nevertheless, we experimented with manual module selection
to investigate whether the success rate increases and whether the
speed is improved. In our experiments, the tested module conﬁg-
urations performed comparably to instrumenting all modules with
regards to the number of successfully repaired ﬁles while being
slightly faster due to less instrumentation.
This means that in principle, one can achieve similar success
rates while being slightly quicker by instrumenting only parts of
the ﬁle viewer. However, since this requires manual intervention,
the process is no longer completely automated and requires addi-
tional knowledge for each ﬁle format. It also adds a time overhead
since some experimentation is needed to ﬁnd a good conﬁguration
of modules. Thus, the beneﬁts of instrumenting all modules
outweigh the beneﬁts of instrumenting fewer modules.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented Force Open, a black box ﬁle repair
solution based on binary instrumentation and execution hijacking
that is adaptable to different ﬁle formats without requiring
knowledge about said ﬁle format or the inner workings of the
instrumented ﬁle viewer. It is a lightweight approach without the
necessity of resource expensive techniques such as symbolic
execution. We implemented and tested our approach with three
different ﬁle formats and compared it to state of the art ﬁle repair
solutions. In our experiments, we were able to show that our
approach can be used to signiﬁcantly improve the repair quota of
existing programs.
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